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Article III Courts and the Constitutional Structure
DAVID A. STRAUSS*

Anyone who reads Paul Bator's Harris Lecture' can understand not only
what was special about his contributions to legal scholarship, but why he
was an extraordinary teacher, and how he became such an exceptionally
successful Supreme Court advocate. His teaching, like this lecture, combined
clarity and wit with power and deep commitment. As an advocate, too, he
was engaged and even emotional; he did not adopt a pose of detachment,
and he did not hide behind technical formulations. He had powerful
intuitions about what the law should be-what it had to be. And no oneI'm certain of this-has ever been as good at coming up with fresh, arresting
words that were perfect for the occasion at hand.
As for those intuitions: the interpretation of article III that Paul advances
in the Harris Lecture is a further development of arguments he made in his
Federal Courts class at least as early as 1978, when I took the course from
him. While this area of law is still confused and uncertain, there is no
doubt about the trend: Paul's view may not be quite the law yet, but it is
2
unquestionably ascendant.
The essence of Paul's view is that Congress should have nearly complete
power to assign federal judicial business-the adjudication of the kinds of
cases enumerated in article III-to federal tribunals whose members are not
article III judges. Some article III court must retain "ultimate control"the power to correct errors of law. And if Congress were to act arbitrarily
or irrationally in assigning cases to non-article III tribunals, the Supreme
Court would retain a "not while this Court sits" power to disapprove
Congress's action. But otherwise Congress's allocation of authority between
article III courts and non-article III tribunals would stand.
It seems to me quite likely that this view will prevail in the long run, to
an even greater extent than it has already. Paul explains why it will prevail,
better than anyone else has. In some respects Paul's defenses of this view
are right on the money; in other respects, his arguments seem to me to be
vulnerable. I begin with my qualms.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Visiting Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1989-90. J.D., 1978, Harvard University; B. Phil., 1975,
Oxford University; A.B., 1973, Harvard University. I am grateful to Larry Kramer and Steven
Goldberg for their comments on an earlier draft. I had the good fortune to be a student of
Paul Bator's at Harvard Law School, then a colleague of his in the Solicitor General's office
and on the Chicago faculty.
1. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under
Article II, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990).
2. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-57 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589-92 (1985).
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1. Administrative adjudication and the central purposes of article IIl.
Paul's argument, like many defenses of non-article III tribunals, proceeds
from the premise that Congress created non-article III tribunals for what
might be called "good government" reasons having to do with efficiency
and expertise: to afford inexpensive and streamlined procedures for handling
large numbers of cases, or because life tenure makes it too difficult to weed
out incompetent or corrupt judges. This development, Paul suggests, might
be in tension with the language of article III, but it is not inconsistent with
any of the policies that article III is centrally concerned to promote. That
is the point of Paul's "architecture" metaphor. The development of nonarticle III tribunals has only rearranged the rooms; it hasn't tampered with
the structure of the Constitution.
Paul's argument seems to me to present an insufficiently cynical version
of the genesis of the administrative state. Efficiency and expertise were part
of the reason for creating non-article III tribunals. But dissatisfaction with
the political orientation of article III courts also played an important role,
as Paul seems to acknowledge at one point in the lectures. The National
Labor Relations Board is the most notorious example; it was deliberately
intended to be more pro-union than the federal judiciary. That-and not
just the need for expertise-was a large part of the reason for establishing
a new body and allowing the President to appoint its members frequently.
In any event, the "good government" justifications of efficiency and
competence do not explain one of the most important and problematic ways
in which administrative agencies do not conform to article III-the exercise
of non-judicial functions. (I owe this point to Paul, who once commented
in conversation that this, not the absence of tenure protections, is the most
important way in which non-article III tribunals differ from article III
courts.) While there is some internal separation of functions, the major
administrative agencies do not just adjudicate; they oversee important
executive, including prosecutorial, tasks. Arguably the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission would not look so
different if its members had life tenure; it's a fair guess that many of them
would be ready to move on after a half-dozen years or so anyway. But the
FTC or SEC would be very different if it had only an adjudicative mission.
To give a prosecutorial mission to an adjudicative body is deeply subversive of article III. Anyone who has been an advocate for one institutional
interest for an extended period will understand why this is true. An advocate
begins to see issues from the point of view of her habitual client: the
government, the insurance industry, criminal defendants. It takes a real
effort to restore one's impartiality; sometimes it is impossible to do so.
Assigning prosecutorial responsibilities to an adjudicator is an excellent way
covertly to affect the adjudication.
Finally, as Paul recognizes, the efficiency and expertise justifications do
not really explain why Congress created non-article III tribunals. We are
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accustomed to thinking of article III adjudication as expensive and timeconsuming, but that is not the fault of article III. Article III does not enact
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nothing in article III prevents Congress
from providing for streamlined adjudication before article III courts in,
say, workers' compensation or social security disability cases.
As for life tenure: thanks to civil service protections, many federal
bureaucrats already have de facto life tenure. The danger of corruption or
malfeasance in a large federal judicial establishment would be a real problem, but one way to deal with it is to do what Congress is attempting to
do now, in addressing allegations of wrongdoing among the (already large)
corps of federal district judges-streamline the procedures for removing
judges.
2. Fact-finding and ultimate judicial control. A key premise of Paul's
argument is that the central purposes of article III remain intact so long as
the article III courts retain ultimate control-by which Paul means the
power to decide issues of law. This conception is at the heart of Crowell
v. Benson,3 and it is the reason Paul celebrates that case.
One difficulty with the Crowell conception is that it is difficult to square
with the rule that courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
the statute the agency is charged with administering. The degree of deference
required by, for example, NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 4-to say
nothing of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 5-gives the final word on questions of law, within a very wide range,
to the agency not the court.
In addition, partisans of the Crowell conception have never fully explained
why judicial control over issues of law is the core purpose of article III.
Why isn't the impartial decision of specific cases the essence of the judicial
function? The most natural inference from the tenure and salary protections
of article III is that the Framers wanted impartial decisions in particular
cases. And of course making impartial decisions in individual cases requires
control over fact-finding as well as law-declaring. In the run of the mill
case, the facts are everything.
In fact, Crowell seems to me to have set into motion a troubling tendency
in separation of powers law-the development of what might be called a
turf-protecting instead of an individual rights orientation. Crowell decided,
in effect, that as long as the courts retained a certain turf-a function or
array of functions that they still controlled-the separation of powers was
not offended. That approach has come to dominate separation of powers
law. Whenever the Supreme Court does not find an answer to a separation

3. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
4. 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
5. 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984).
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of powers issue in the plain language of the Constitution, it resolves the
issue by deciding whether a measure has invaded the prerogatives of one
6
of the branches to an unacceptable degree.
But that approach is arbitrary in a variety of ways. How does one
determine what each branch's turf is? And how does one determine what
constitutes an excessive invasion of a branch's turf? For example, why is it
not an excessive invasion of the prerogatives of the executive branch to
deprive it of most control over a class of criminal prosecutions? 7 And what
degree of deference to agency discretion constitutes an invasion of the
prerogatives of the judiciary?
It might be better to try to identify the ways in which various separation
of powers provisions seek to protect individual rights, and interpret them
in a way that maintains those protections. If one were to do that, it is by
no means clear that the administrative state-with fact-finding that is
responsive to political pressures and influenced by a prosecutor's orientation-can be squared with article III.
Notwithstanding these cavils, there is something fundamentally correct
about Paul's view, both conceptually and historically.
1. The indivisibility of executive and judicialfunctions. This is the most
powerful of Paul's arguments. What courts do when they decide a case is
in principle indistinguishable from what an executive official does when she
applies a legal standard in the course of executing a law. A customs inspector
levying a duty, a tax collector assessing a tax, even a law enforcement
officer deciding whether there is probable cause to believe that a suspect
has violated the law-each is, in a sense, resolving a dispute between two
parties (the government and the object of the government's action); each
finds facts and interprets and applies the law. A literal reading of article
III might lead to the conclusion that government employees like these are
article III judges who must have tenure and salary protections. That
conclusion, of course, is absurd.
Of course, executive determinations of this kind do not look like adjudication. Often they are ex parte; they are usually very informal, with no
prescribed procedures; and the adjudicator makes no pretense of judicial
impartiality. But what difference does that make? It would be perverse to
say that article III does not apply when issues are resolved in an informal
setting with few safeguards designed to ensure impartiality and regularity,
but does apply to bodies that look like courts-that is, to bodies that have
adopted some such safeguards.

6. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-28 (1976).
7. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2597.
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This problem-the indistinguishability of the executive and judicial function-is similar to, but worse than, the problem that has led to the de facto
abandonment of the non-delegation doctrine. That doctrine holds that a
statute is invalid if it confers such broad discretion on an official that it
essentially delegates the legislative power to the official. 8 The problem is
that it is difficult to prescribe a standard for determining whether a
delegation is too broad. But at least one can define the paradigms of
legislative and executive action in a way that distinguishes them: legislative
action consists in prescribing standards; executive action in applying them.
The problem with non-article III tribunals is that even in principle, one
cannot define the difference between judicial action and (at least certain
forms of) undoubted executive action.
There seem to be two possible ways out of this conundrum, but neither
is satisfactory. One is to say that as long as courts review executive action
de novo, there is no article III problem. The argument would be that article
III speaks only of the exercise of judicial power, and so long as an executive
official's action is reviewed de novo she has exercised no power. The other
way out would be to say that article III's tenure and salary restrictions
apply only to those who adjudicate disputes between private parties, because
such adjudication has no counterpart in the executive branch. (In each of
the examples of undoubted executive power I mentioned above, one of the
"parties" was the government.) This latter approach actually resonates with
Justice Brennan's opinion in Northern Pipeline,9 at which Paul aims so
many well-chosen verbal arrows.
But the de novo review option would sharply change the character of the
administrative state and nullify many of its advantages. And confining
article III protections to courts that resolve disputes between private parties
is not only counter-intuitive-surely the need for tenure and salary protection
is greater, not less, when the government is a party-but difficult to square
with article III's specific grant of judicial power over cases involving the
government.
2. Has history "amended" the Constitution? One of Paul's molt telling
points is his challenge to the opponents of his view to come up with a
coherent position that they are willing to implement. As he says, no one
seriously suggests that we should dismantle the administrative state and
return to supposed article III purity. 0 It is possible that even by the time
of Crowell, the development of the administrative state was so advanced

8. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 654-58 (1989); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935).
9. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
10. Bator, supra note 1, at 260-63.
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that a return to what Paul calls the Simple Model' (if "return" is the right
word) was not possible.
Despite the force of his arguments, at the end of his lecture Paul seems
ambivalent about whether the development of non-article III tribunals has
in fact altered the constitutional architecture. I think he is right to be at
least ambivalent; the unwillingness to recognize that this institutional development has altered the constitutional structure in a significant way, has
the potential to lead us astray.
The proliferation of non-article III adjudication gives the executive branch
great power to implement policies in a most troubling way: not by persuading
Congress to enact them into law, nor even by announcing them publicly,
but by quietly influencing the orientation of the adjudicators. This happened
in the NLRB in the Roosevelt Administration; in a more sinister way, it
happened to the Social Security disability program in the Reagan Administration. It is one thing for the executive to announce plans to restrict
eligibility for certain public benefits. It is quite another to convey the
message to Administrative Law Judges that they are to be more skeptical
of the claims of certain categories of recipients. The latter course-which
is possible only if adjudication is undertaken by non-article III tribunalsenables the executive to conceal its policy decisions from public and congressional scrutiny. We are likely to underestimate the significance of this
development if we insist too strongly that the basic structure of article III
remains intact.

11. Id. at 234-35.
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